First Name | Daniel |
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Last Name | Richter |
Email Address | darichter@gmail.com |
Affiliation | |
Subject | Revenue-Neutral Fee and Dividend. |
Comment | Abstract: The goal of the cap and trade system in the ARB scoping plan is to reduce our greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The ARB must now attempt to lower our emissions during tough economic times. An incrementally increasing, revenue-neutral carbon fee assessed upstream with 100% of proceeds returned evenly to Californians as a monthly check can lower our emissions less expensively than cap-and-trade while simultaneously helping the economically vulnerable. Seeing such a "green check" arrive in the mail each month also holds the potential to precipitate a paradigm shift in the way the Californian public views and acts with regard to the causes of climate change. For all these reasons, I urge the ARB to implement such a revenue-neutral fee and dividend in the place of cap and trade. Effectiveness of a carbon fee vs. cap and trade: In a 2008 study (1), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that a carbon tax was more efficient (i.e. achieved the same reductions in emissions at a lower cost) than any iteration of a cap-and-trade system considered ("Summary Table 1" in this document is particularly helpful). This included an inflexible cap system, and various iterations of a flexible cap with a safety valve. True, this analysis was made for the United States as a whole. But since California accounts for 12% of the US population (2) and a roughly comparable portion of US GDP (3), I make the assumption that lessons applicable to the US are also applicable to California. Salient highlights from this report include: - A tax could achieve a long-term emissions targets at roughly a fifth the cost of an inflexible cap. - A tax is comparatively simple to implement, as it could build on already existing infrastructure for levying and collecting existing taxes. - A tax avoids year-to-year fluctuations in price, significantly aiding businesses in long-term planning. - Because it has a single price in any given year, a tax is simpler to harmonize internationally, or to assess at our borders for interstate or international commerce. The next most efficient incarnation in this report, a cap-and-trade system with a price ceiling and a price floor, is essentially a tax. If there is a high price limit, and a low price limit, why not take the average price and skip all the bureaucracy associated with setting up, monitoring, and regulating the exchange? Benefits of returning the proceeds evenly to all Californians: It is widely acknowledged that the poor spend a higher percentage of their income on fossil carbon, but less than the rich on carbon overall (4, 5, 6). Indeed, this makes intuitive sense. The poor tend to take public transportation more often, travel by air less, and tend to own fewer Hummers. This means the poor would be disproportionately affected by a price on carbon. In other words, a carbon price on its own is regressive. It is a good idea at any time to make sure that our most vulnerable citizens do not bear the brunt of a price on carbon. It is especially true in these tough economic times with bloated unemployment numbers and cuts to government safety nets. It is therefore desirable that any carbon pricing mechanism be progressive, not regressive. If we accept that a price on carbon should be progressive and not regressive, what is the best way to do this? Of 5 policies considered, Butraw (4) found 3 policies progressive (expansion of the Earned Income Credit, and direct return of the money as taxable or non-taxable income) and 2 regressive (reducing income or payroll taxes). The CBO (5) found similar results. The Carbon Tax Center (6) has a readable and relatively condensed analysis of this with thought-provoking numbers. Of these progressive options, I urge the ARB to adopt returning 100% of the proceeds as either a taxable or non-taxable dividend each month directly to California households. Firstly, a monthly dividend will save poorer Californians from having to bear the costs of higher carbon prices the entire year before getting relief. Instead, they would be able to keep up with the higher bills, and have some extra money left above their costs. Extra money in the hands of the poor is more likely to generate revenue than money put in the hands of the rich, as it is more likely to be spent on things such as clothes and food rather than saved. It may be considered a type of unemployment insurance, which generates $1.62 in economic activity for every dollar spent (7). Thus, not only will returning the proceeds from the fee in this way help the poor while reducing our emissions at minimal cost to the government, it may also stimulate the economy. Eliciting a paradigm shift: What may prove to be the most important piece of this proposal is the potential of this monthly "green check" to precipitate a paradigm shift in the way Californians think and make decisions about their own carbon emissions. When people see that check every month, they will very quickly realize that by changing their behavior, they can "get under" the fee. That is, by embracing lower-carbon activities, they will be making money. This monthly check thus adds a carrot to the end of the stick that is higher carbon prices. Recall the significant change in behavior we all witnessed during the gas price spikes of 2008. The high gas prices were all stick and no carrot, but still people made significant changes in the way they acted and what they purchased. The carrot of more money in their pocket on top of the higher carbon prices that we know can change behavior can only speed our journey to lower carbon emissions. Conclusions: In summary, an incrementally increasing, revenue-neutral carbon fee assessed upstream with 100% of proceeds returned evenly to Californians as a "green check" is a superior policy to cap-and-trade. Due to its price stability and ability to piggy-back on top of existing government infrastructure, it imposes lower costs on businesses and government for the same emissions reductions. It helps the poor at a time when they need all the help they can get. By putting money in their hands, it is likely to actually stimulate the economy while still cutting carbon. Finally, by returning the money as a monthly "green check", it offers every Californian "carrot" incentives to change their habits on top of the "stick" incentives imposed by any price on carbon. Perhaps more than anything, this will place California in the lead both in the nation and in the world in the race to regain a stable climate. Thank you for reading my comment. References: 1. Congressional Budget office. "Policy options for reducing CO2 emissions". 2008. URL: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8934/02-12-Carbon.pdf 2. United States Census Bureau. "State and County QuickFacts". Last accessed: 7/24/11. URL: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html 3. EconPost. "California Economy Ranking in the World". Posted 2/3/11. Last accessed: 7/25/11. URL: http://econpost.com/californiaeconomy/california-economy-ranking-among-world-economies 4. D. Butraw, R. Sweeney and M. Walls. "The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit". 2008. Resources for the future. URL: http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-08-28.pdf 5. The Congressional Budget Office. "Trade-Offs in Allocating Allowances for CO2 Emissions". 2007. Economic and Budget Issue Brief. URL: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/80xx/doc8027/04-25-Cap_Trade.pdf 6. The Carbon Tax Center. "Demographics". Last updated: 3/22/11. Last accessed: 7/24/11. URL: http://www.carbontax.org/issues/softening-the-impact-of-carbon-taxes/ 7. The Economist magazine. "The Struggle to Eat". Issue: July 14th, 2011. |
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Date and Time Comment Was Submitted | 2011-07-25 12:06:15 |
If you have any questions or comments please contact Clerk of the Board at (916) 322-5594.