

2016 Auction Examples

California Cap-and-Trade Program and Québec Cap-and-Trade System Joint Auction of Greenhouse Gas Allowances

This document provides information on auction bidding limitations and the settlement price determination process, and examples of how to determine the amount of a bid guarantee, how holding and purchase limits are applied, how United States (U.S.) and Canadian currencies are handled, and how joint auctions are settled. This document is guidance only and does not supersede the California Cap-and-Trade Regulation (California Regulation) or the Québec Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances (Québec Regulation). In circumstances of uncertainty, the California and Québec Regulations are the controlling documents.

Entities registered under the Québec Cap-and-Trade System (QC entities) may participate in joint auctions in either United States Dollars (USD) or Canadian Dollars (CAD). Joint auction bid evaluations and settlement price determination will be conducted in USD. The value of all bid guarantees and bid prices submitted in CAD will be converted into USD in whole cents using the established Auction Exchange Rate to conduct the auction in a single currency, including the evaluation of bids on a common basis. All bid assessments, the settlement price, and the cost of all allowances awarded will be determined in USD. For any QC entity participating in CAD, the total cost of allowances is first determined in USD (USD settlement price multiplied by number of allowances awarded) and then converted to a CAD value based on the Auction Exchange Rate¹ so the entity can complete financial settlement in CAD.

For entities bidding in CAD, an example of how to determine a bid guarantee in CAD is provided in this document and illustrated in Table 1a. Example 9 includes a description of how the CAD amount due for allowances awarded is calculated for QC entities participating in CAD. All other examples throughout this document assume bids are submitted in USD.

¹ To manage multiple currencies, an Auction Exchange Rate is determined prior to each joint auction.

I. Determining an Entity's Bid Guarantee

Table 1 presents hypothetical bid submissions for an auction in which seven entities are participating. In the following examples, it is assumed that each of the participants is only bidding in the Current Auction and all bids are submitted in USD. Considerations for participation in the Advance Auction are included at the end of this document. Each row in Table 1 provides the bid value at each bid price. The Auction Administrator will accept bids for lots of allowances; each bid lot represents 1,000 allowances.

Table 1: Maximum Bid Value of Bidder's USD Bids

Entity Name	Bid Price	Bid Lots	Bid Number of Allowances	Entity Cumulative Allowances	Entity Cumulative Bid Value
A	\$23.87	40	40,000	40,000	\$954,800
A	\$19.41	55	55,000	95,000	\$1,843,950
A	\$16.23	70	70,000	165,000	\$2,677,950
A	\$13.04	85	85,000	250,000	\$3,260,000
B	\$17.79	80	80,000	80,000	\$1,423,200
B	\$12.75	170	170,000	250,000	\$3,187,500
C	\$45.29	25	25,000	25,000	\$1,132,250
C	\$40.98	100	100,000	125,000	\$5,122,500
C	\$29.83	40	40,000	165,000	\$4,921,950
D	\$22.66	50	50,000	50,000	\$1,133,000
D	\$19.35	120	120,000	170,000	\$3,289,500
E	\$20.75	35	35,000	35,000	\$726,250
E	\$18.46	50	50,000	85,000	\$1,569,100
E	\$16.23	70	70,000	155,000	\$2,515,650
E	\$12.73	110	110,000	265,000	\$3,373,450
F	\$12.73	200	200,000	200,000	\$2,546,000
G	\$20.75	50	50,000	50,000	\$1,037,500
G	\$19.35	120	120,000	170,000	\$3,289,500

Table 1 Terminology

Bid Number of Allowances = Bid Lots * 1,000

Entity Cumulative Allowances = Sum of current Bid Number of Allowances and Bid Number of Allowances at each higher Bid Price

Entity Cumulative Bid Value = Entity Cumulative Allowances * Bid Price

When bidding in an auction, the bid currency, bid price, number of bid lots, and instrument vintage are entered for each bid. When placing bids for the Current Auction, the vintage selection is “Current.” The Current Auction may include allowances from the current and previous budget years. These allowances can include allowances that have been made available for auction from closed Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS) accounts, allowances submitted for untimely surrender obligations, allowances returned as the result of an enforcement settlement, and allowances from previous budget years which were offered but not sold at previous auctions held by California or Québec. In the event that the Current Auction contains multiple vintage years, bids cannot be placed for a particular vintage but are instead submitted as “Current” vintage. The vintage to be selected when placing bids in the Advance Auction is the year of the allowances offered in the Advance Auction (in 2016, vintage 2019 allowances are offered for Advance Auction and the vintage selection is 2019).

For CA entities, the bid currency will be selected as USD. For QC entities, the bid currency will be entered as USD or CAD, based on the currency selection made during the auction application or confirmation of intent to bid process. The cumulative allowances shown in Table 1 are not entered or shown in the bid schedule, but are shown here for illustrative purposes. The “Entity Cumulative Allowances” column indicates the total allowances the entity has submitted bids to purchase at that bid price and all higher bid prices.

The following are examples of how an entity might calculate the minimum bid guarantee required to avoid having their bids rejected:

Example 1: Calculating a Bid Guarantee When Submitting Multiple Bids in USD

As shown in Table 1, Entity A has submitted four different bids at four different USD bid prices:

- Bid price of \$23.87: Entity A bid for 40,000 allowances at a cost of \$954,800.
- Bid price of \$19.41: Entity A bid for 95,000 allowances at a cost of \$1,843,950. (95,000 allowances = 40,000 + 55,000)
- Bid price of \$16.23: Entity A bid for 165,000 allowances at a cost of \$2,677,950. (165,000 allowances = 40,000 + 55,000 + 70,000)
- Bid price of \$13.04: Entity A bid for 250,000 allowances at a cost of \$3,260,000. (250,000 allowances = 40,000 + 55,000 + 70,000 + 85,000)

Entity A’s bid schedule shows that it is willing to purchase a total of 250,000 allowances at a price of \$13.04 at a maximum bid value of \$3,260,000. **Entity A**

should submit a bid guarantee of at least \$3,260,000 if it wants to buy all the allowances in its bid schedule as highlighted in Table 1 above.

Using the same evaluation process for the bid schedules submitted by Entities B to G, the maximum total value of each entity's bid schedule is determined, shown above in Table 1, highlighted in grey.

Based on this example, each entity's bid guarantee should be equal to or greater than the maximum cumulative bid value for the planned bid schedule in Table 1. Entities bidding in an auction will be limited to incurring a total cost less than or equal to the dollar amount of the bid guarantee submitted and should evaluate their bids against the bid guarantee they provided in the manner illustrated in this example. The California Regulation requires bid guarantees to be greater than or equal to the maximum value of the bids to be submitted.

Assuming bids are submitted in USD, the minimum bid guarantee Bidders A to G should submit to avoid having their bid(s) rejected in lots of 1,000 allowances by the Auction Administrator would be as follows:

- Bidder A – \$3,260,000
- Bidder B – \$3,187,500
- Bidder C – \$5,122,500
- Bidder D – \$3,289,500
- Bidder E – \$3,373,450
- Bidder F – \$2,546,000
- Bidder G – \$3,289,500

Example 2: Calculating a Bid Guarantee When Submitting Multiple Bids in CAD

Example 1 above assumes an entity submitted bids in USD. A QC entity has the option of participating in a joint auction in USD or CAD, and must submit bids in the currency chosen in the auction application or confirmation of intent to bid. The value of all bids and bid guarantees submitted in CAD will be converted into USD in whole cents using the established Auction Exchange Rate to conduct the auction in a single currency, including the evaluation of bids on a common basis. A QC entity participating in CAD should consider the effect of a change in the exchange rate between the day the bid guarantee is submitted and the Auction Exchange Rate in effect for a joint auction when determining the amount of the bid guarantee. The USD value of a bid guarantee submitted in CAD will change as a result of a change in the

exchange rate from the time the bid guarantee is submitted to the Auction Exchange Rate in effect for a joint auction.

Table 1a is a variation of Table 1 that presents the same bid schedule previously described for Entity A, except the bid currency is CAD and for this example the USD to CAD Auction Exchange Rate is 1.1000. For the first bid in the table below, the bid price of \$26.26 CAD converts to \$23.87 USD ($\$26.26 / 1.1000 = \23.87).

For the purpose of this document and all examples, the Auction Exchange Rate is 1.1000 (USD to CAD) and the Auction Reserve Price for both the Current and Advance Auction is \$12.73 USD / \$14.00 CAD per allowance.

Table 1a: Maximum Bid Value of Bidder A's CAD Bids

Entity Name	Bid Price (CAD)	Bid Price Value (USD)	Bid Lots	Bid Number of Allowances	Cumulative Allowances	Cumulative Bid Value Price (USD)	Cumulative Bid Value at Each Bid (CAD) ²
A	\$26.26	\$23.87	40	40,000	40,000	\$954,800	\$1,050,280
A	\$21.35	\$19.41	55	55,000	95,000	\$1,843,950	\$2,028,345
A	\$17.85	\$16.23	70	70,000	165,000	\$2,677,950	\$2,945,745
A	\$14.34	\$13.04	85	85,000	250,000	\$3,260,000	\$3,586,000

The Québec Regulation requires that the maximum amount of an entity's bids must not exceed the amount of the bid guarantee submitted. If Entity A is participating in CAD, and assuming an Auction Exchange Rate of 1.1000 (USD to CAD), the minimum bid guarantee Entity A should submit to avoid having its bids limited by the Auction Administrator would be as follows:

Entity A – maximum value of bids submitted is \$3,586,000 CAD and thus, this is the minimum amount that Entity A should submit to avoid having its bid(s) rejected in lots of 1,000 allowances by the Auction Administrator. With an Auction Exchange Rate of 1.1000 USD to CAD, \$3,586,000 CAD is equal to \$3,260,000 USD, which is the bid guarantee amount that will be used in the Auction Platform.

II. Bid Guarantees for Current and Advance Auctions

Bidders submit a single bid guarantee for both the Current Auction and the Advance Auction. Once the Current Auction settlement price has been determined, the entity's

² The CAD value at each bid price is calculated using the following formula: Cumulative Total Allowances Bid * USD Bid Price * Auction Exchange Rate (1.1000).

total cost for allowances awarded in the Current Auction (USD settlement price multiplied by number of allowances awarded) will be determined and deducted from the bid guarantee amount, and any bid guarantee amount remaining will be applied to the Advance Auction. The bid guarantee is applied to the Current Auction and the Advance Auction in the form of USD currency, regardless of the currency selected by the bidder.

Example 3: Application of a Single Bid Guarantee to Current and Advance Auction

If Entity A in Table 1 submitted a bid guarantee of \$10,000,000 USD and the auction settlement price for the Current Auction is \$15.43 USD, then the cost of allowances awarded in the Current Auction is \$2,545,950.

Entity A's remaining bid guarantee amount of \$7,454,050 USD would be available to be applied to bids submitted for the Advance Auction.

$$165,000 \text{ allowances} * \$15.43 = \$2,545,950 \text{ USD}$$

$$\$10,000,000 - \$2,545,950 = \$7,454,050 \text{ USD}$$

For QC entities that have selected to participate in CAD, the value of all bids and bid guarantees submitted in CAD will be converted into USD in whole cents using the established Auction Exchange Rate. If Entity A in Table 1a submitted a bid guarantee of \$10,000,000 CAD, the USD value would be \$9,090,909³ (\$10,000,000 / 1.1000). If the auction settlement price for the Current Auction is \$15.43 USD, the cost of allowances awarded would again be \$2,545,950 USD (165,000 allowances * \$15.43), and the remaining bid guarantee amount available for the Advance Auction would be \$6,544,959 USD.

$$\$9,090,909 \text{ (USD)} - \$2,545,950 \text{ (USD)} = \$6,544,959 \text{ (USD)}$$

III. Entity Bid Evaluation Procedures for Purchase Limits and Holding Limits

Example 4 and Example 5 below illustrate how bidders should evaluate their Current Auction bid schedules for purchase limits and holding limits.

³ For this example, the actual USD value is \$9,090,909.09. For ease of presentation, all currency amounts other than bid prices in text and tables are rounded to whole dollars.

A. Purchase Limits

The purchase limit that applies to one entity or a group of entities with a direct corporate association for the Current Auction and separately for the Advance Auction is as follows:

For CA entities:

- The purchase limit for covered entities and opt-in covered entities, including electrical distribution utilities, will be 25 percent of the allowances offered for auction; and
- The purchase limit for general market participants is 4 percent of the allowances offered for auction.

For QC entities:

- The purchase limit for emitters is 25 percent of the allowances offered for auction; and
- The purchase limit for participants is 4 percent of the allowances offered for auction.

The purchase limit percentages identified above apply to the total number of allowances offered for sale in the Current Auction and independently to the total number of allowances offered for sale in the Advance Auction as presented in the Auction Notice.

Example 4: Determining an Entity's Current Auction Purchase Limit

For each category of entity, multiply the purchase limit percentage for the entity category by the total amount of allowances available for auction. The purchase limit is determined independently for the Current Auction and the Advance Auction. While the purchase limit percentages are the same for each auction, the allowance supply for the Current Auction and the Advance Auction are not, and thus the number of allowances an entity can purchase in the Current and Advance Auction without exceeding the purchase limit is different. For example, the Current Auction purchase limit for an entity that is a CA covered entity or a QC emitter is calculated as:

Allowances offered for sale in the Current Auction = 1,000,000 allowances

Current Auction purchase limit percentage = 25 percent

Purchase limit = $1,000,000 * 0.25$

Purchase limit = 250,000 allowances

B. Holding Limits

The holding limit applies to all entities across all linked jurisdictions and is based on the following formula:

$$\text{Holding Limit} = 0.1 * \text{Base} + 0.025 * (\text{Annual Allowance Budget} - \text{Base})$$

Where:

“Base” equals 25 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂e).

“Annual Allowance Budget” is the number of allowances issued for the current budget year.⁴

For 2016, the annual budget in California and Québec is 445,590,000 allowances.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Holding Limit} &= 0.1 * 25,000,000 + 0.025 * (445,590,000 - 25,000,000) \\ \text{2016 Holding Limit} &= 13,014,750 \text{ allowances} \end{aligned}$$

The holding limit is the maximum number of allowances an entity may hold or the maximum number of allowances that may be jointly held by a group of entities within a direct corporate association.

Allowances purchased in the Current Auction are subject to the current vintage holding limit detailed in section 95920(c)(1) of the California Regulation and Article 32 of the Québec Regulation. The current vintage holding limit applies to allowances from the current calendar year, previous calendar years, and allowances purchased from the Allowance Price Containment Reserve and the Minister’s reserve account.

There is a separate holding limit for each calendar year of allowances with a vintage year beyond the current calendar year. For the Advance Auction, allowances purchased in the Advance Auction are subject to the holding limit for the vintage year of the allowances sold at that Advance Auction pursuant to section 95920(c)(2) of the California Regulation and Article 32 of the Québec Regulation.

A covered entity or emitter may exempt a limited number of allowances from the current vintage holding limit by transferring them to its compliance account. This “limited exemption” is described in section 95920(d)(2) of the California Regulation and Article 32 of the Québec Regulation. The limited exemption is based on an entity’s emissions, and is designed to allow covered entities the ability to accumulate the allowances they need for compliance. For that reason, the limited exemption is increased each year by the amount of the entity’s emissions contained in the most recent verified emissions data

⁴ The annual allowance budget in a linked program includes allowances issued by participating jurisdictions.

report. The limited exemption is decreased at the end of the year following the close of a compliance period, after the entity has completed its surrender obligation for the compliance period.

Entities can calculate the maximum number of allowances they can hold using Example 5 and the holding limit values from Table 2 below.

Example 5: Determining the Maximum Number of Allowances an Entity Can Hold and Purchase to Comply with the Holding Limit

The maximum number of allowances an entity can hold at one time equals the holding limit plus the limited exemption. The limited exemption is the number of allowances that are exempt from the holding limit calculation if held by an entity in its compliance account. Assuming an entity takes full advantage of the limited exemption, in 2016 the maximum number of allowances that may be held is calculated as:

$$\text{Maximum Number of Allowances Held} = 13,014,750 + \text{Limited Exemption}$$

When submitting bids in an auction, an entity may not exceed the applicable holding limits. Suppose an entity's limited exemption is equal to 4,000,000 allowances and it holds 1,000,000 allowances in its compliance account and an additional 2,000,000 vintage 2016 or prior allowances in its general holding account; in this case, the maximum number of allowances the entity can hold and stay below the holding limit is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Maximum Number of Allowances Held} = \\ 13,014,750 + 4,000,000 - 1,000,000 - 2,000,000 = 14,014,750 \text{ allowances.} \end{aligned}$$

In this example, for an entity with a limited exemption of 4,000,000 and 1,000,000 allowances in its compliance account, 3,000,000 allowances purchased at auction could be transferred directly to the entity's compliance account to take full advantage of the limited exemption in compliance with the holding limit.

Although the California Regulation allows the Executive Officer to transfer allowances awarded in an auction to an entity's general holding account or its compliance account as needed to facilitate compliance with the holding limit, the entity should ensure it makes all necessary transfers itself.

Per the Québec Regulation, Québec will not deposit allowances directly into an emitter's compliance account. Therefore, any QC entity purchasing allowances that would bring its total beyond its holding limit will have to transfer any allowances in excess of the holding limit into its compliance account to take full advantage of the limited exemption.

It is each QC entity's responsibility to complete any necessary transfer of allowances within five (5) days of the date the holding limit is exceeded to conform to the holding limit as indicated in Article 32 of Québec Regulation.

For a QC entity purchasing allowances at auction that would exceed the current vintage holding limit, if allowances exceeding the holding limit remain in the general holding account five (5) days after the auction allowance distribution, the excess allowances will be removed and put back in the Auction Account of the Minister to be sold in a subsequent auction.

Entities can hold more allowances in their compliance account than allowed under the limited exemption, but any allowances in excess of the limited exemption will count towards the holding limit. If the entity in the prior example had a compliance account balance of 4,500,000 allowances, the following represents the allowances which may be purchased without exceeding the holding limit:

Maximum Number of Allowances Held =
 $13,014,750 + 4,000,000 - 4,500,000 - 2,000,000 = 10,514,750$ allowances.

IV. Auction Administrator Application of the Bid Evaluation Criteria

The Auction Administrator will not accept any bids for which the bid price is less than the Auction Reserve Price. The Auction Reserve Price is stated in both USD and CAD and bid prices will be evaluated against the Auction Reserve Price in the currency in which the bids are submitted (i.e., USD bids must be submitted at a price equal to or above the Auction Reserve Price in USD, and CAD bids must be at a price equal to or above the Auction Reserve Price in CAD). For the purposes of this document and all examples, the Auction Reserve Price for both the Current Auction and Advance Auction is \$12.73 USD and \$14.00 CAD.

Submitted bids that contain bid quantities in excess of the purchase limit or the holding limit, or have a maximum value in excess of the bid guarantee at the settlement price, will be rejected, in bundles of 1,000 allowances, until all bid limitations are met. Only that portion of the bid quantity that exceeds one or more limit(s) will be rejected, not the entire bid quantity. Bid quantities that have been rejected will not be considered in determining the settlement price. "Qualified bids" are the bids that remain after the submitted bids have been evaluated and reduced to meet all limits.

Determination of qualified bids occurs after the bidding window has been closed and before the settlement price is determined. The process is the same for the Current Auction and the Advance Auction. The result is a set of qualified bids from which the settlement price is determined for both the Current Auction and the Advance Auction.

Table 2 shows bid evaluation data for a sample Current Auction where 1,000,000 allowances are available. These data will be used to demonstrate how the Auction Administrator will evaluate each entity's bids submitted for the Current Auction. In some cases, a bid may exceed more than one evaluation criterion (i.e., purchase limit, holding limit, or bid guarantee value). When a bid is limited by more than one criterion, the bid will be reduced in lots of 1,000 allowances to the most limiting constraint.

Table 2: Bid Evaluation Data

Entity Name	Entity Type	Purchase Limit (Number of Allowances)	Holding Limit (Number of Allowances) ⁵	Bid Guarantee (USD)
A	QC Emitter	250,000	13,014,750	\$3,261,200
B	CA Covered Entity	250,000	13,014,750	\$2,805,100
C	CA Electrical Distribution Utility	250,000	13,014,750	\$6,407,000
D	QC Emitter	250,000	13,014,750	\$3,289,800
E	QC Emitter	250,000	13,014,750	\$3,366,400
F	CA Covered Entity	250,000	13,014,750	\$2,577,400
G	QC Participant	40,000	13,014,750	\$3,289,800

Purchase limits in the examples throughout this document are based on the percentages assigned to each entity type as described previously.

In the sample bid evaluation data in Table 2, the bid guarantees represent the bid guarantees submitted. In some cases, the bid guarantee is different from the maximum total value of an entity's bid schedule shown in Table 1. This is done to demonstrate how the bid guarantee criteria impacts bids if the bid guarantee is less than the bid value at a specific bid price and how the bid guarantee is used in the Advance Auction.

Since the bid guarantee and bid prices submitted in CAD are converted to USD before any bid evaluations or determination of the settlement price, the bid evaluation process is the same for bids submitted in USD and CAD.

⁵ This column denotes the number of allowances that can be purchased within the current vintage holding limit. Assumes general holding account balance is zero and that allowances in the compliance account are exactly equal to the limited exemption.

A. Purchase Limit Evaluation

Example 6: Purchase Limit Evaluation by Comparison of Sample Bid Schedules in Table 1 Against the Sample Bid Evaluation Data Criteria in Table 2.

Entity A: Entity A's bids are within its purchase limit of 250,000 allowances.

Entity B: Entity B's bids are within its purchase limit of 250,000 allowances.

Entity C: Entity C's bids are within its purchase limit of 250,000 allowances.

Entity D: Entity D's bids are within its purchase limit of 250,000 allowances.

Entity E: Entity E's bids are not within its purchase limit as the cumulative total of its bids, 265,000 allowances, exceeds the purchase limit of 250,000 allowances. As a result, Entity E's submitted bids that contain bid quantities in excess of the purchase limit will be rejected in lots of 1,000 allowances until the purchase limit is met. Thus, only the portion of the bid that exceeds the limit will be rejected, not the entire bid. Entity E's first three bids sum to 155,000 allowances. It can purchase no more than an additional 95,000 allowances (250,000 - 155,000). Thus, Entity E's fourth bid would be limited to 95,000 allowances.

Entity F: Entity F's bids are within its purchase limit of 250,000 allowances.

Entity G: Entity G's bids are not within its purchase limit as the cumulative total of its bids, 170,000 allowances, exceeds the purchase limit of 40,000 allowances. Submitted bids that contain bid quantities in excess of the purchase limit will be rejected in lots of 1,000 allowances until the purchase limit is met. Thus, only the portion of the bid that exceeds the limit will be rejected, not the entire bid. Entity G's first bid is for 50,000 allowances. Thus, Entity G's first bid would be limited to 40,000 allowances and the second bid would be rejected.

B. Holding Limit Evaluation

In Example 7, the available space within an entity's holding limit is defined as the maximum number of allowances that can be purchased by an entity at the auction while in compliance with the holding limit. This is described in the 2016 Detailed Auction Requirements and Instructions document as the holding limit cap that the jurisdictions transmit to the Auction Administrator prior to the auction. Denoted as 'Holding Limit' in Table 2, the holding limit cap indicates how many allowances an auction participant may acquire before exceeding their holding limit.

Example 7: Holding Limit Evaluation by Comparison of Bids in Table 1 against the Sample Bid Evaluation Data in Table 2.

In this example, and assuming all entities have no holdings of current or prior vintage allowances in their general holding accounts, all the bids submitted by entities are within their current vintage holding limit; no bidder has bid for more than 13,014,750 cumulative allowances.

C. Bid Guarantee Evaluation

The California Regulation requires the amount of the bid guarantee to be greater than or equal to the maximum value of the bids to be submitted. Prior to auction settlement, the Auction Administrator will evaluate the submitted bid guarantee for each entity for the Current Auction in USD, regardless of the currency in which bids are submitted. As an entity provides a single bid guarantee, any funds remaining once the Current Auction settlement price has been determined, and the cost of allowances awarded in the Current Auction has been deducted, will be applied to the Advance Auction. The settlement price algorithm is structured to recognize that a bid that is limited by the bid guarantee at a submitted bid price may not be limited as much or limited at all at lower potential settlement prices. If a bid quantity is limited by the bid guarantee at the submitted bid price, but could be fulfilled if the settlement price is lower than the submitted bid price, the bidder will be awarded allowances up to the bid quantity and the limits of the bid guarantee.

Example 8 below illustrates an example in which an entity's bid guarantee provided in Table 2 is insufficient to cover its maximum total bid cost provided in Table 1. All bid guarantee examples below reflect a USD bid guarantee value.

Example 8: Bid Guarantee Evaluation

Entity A: Entity A's bid guarantee of \$3,261,200 USD is sufficient to cover its maximum total bid cost of \$3,260,000 USD.

Entity B: Entity B's bid guarantee of \$2,805,100 USD is not sufficient to cover its maximum total bid cost of \$3,187,500 USD. The Auction Administrator would reduce Entity B's 2nd bid to 140,000 allowances. At the bid price of \$12.75, a total of 220,000 allowances can be purchased with the submitted bid guarantee ($\$2,805,100 / \$12.75 \text{ USD} = 220,007$, rounded down to 220,000). The total number of allowances that can be purchased through the second bid is 140,000 (220,000 - 80,000). Thus, Entity B's second bid would be limited to 140 bid lots based on the bid guarantee limitation. See Table 1 for Entity B's bidding details.

Entity C: Entity C's bid guarantee of \$6,407,000 USD is sufficient to cover its maximum total bid cost of \$5,122,500 USD.

Entity D: Entity D's bid guarantee of \$3,289,800 USD is sufficient to cover its maximum total bid cost of \$3,289,500 USD.

Entity E: Entity E's bid guarantee of \$3,366,400 is not sufficient to cover its maximum total bid cost of \$3,373,450. At the bid price of \$12.73, the Auction Administrator would reduce Entity E's fourth bid to 109,000 allowances. A total of 264,446 allowances can be purchased with the submitted bid guarantee ($\$3,366,400 / 12.73 = 264,446$). Rounded down to nearest bid lot, the total number of allowances that can be purchased through the fourth bid is 109,000 (264,000 - 155,000). Thus, Entity E's fourth bid would be limited to 109 bid lots based on the bid guarantee limitation. See Table 1 for Entity E's bidding details.

Entity E's fourth bid is limited by the purchase limit and its bid guarantee. When a bid is limited by more than one criterion, the bid will be reduced in lots of 1,000 allowances to the most limiting constraint. A reduction of the fourth bid to 109,000 allowances would meet the bid guarantee limit but not the purchase limit. The fourth bid would be reduced to 95,000 allowances to meet both limitations. The bid must pass all evaluations to be qualified and in this example, the most limiting criterion is the purchase limit. Therefore, Entity E's qualified fourth bid is 95 bid lots.

Entity F: Entity F's bid guarantee of \$2,577,400 USD is sufficient to cover its maximum total bid cost of \$2,546,000 USD.

Entity G: Entity G's bid guarantee of \$3,289,800 USD is sufficient to cover its maximum total bid cost of \$3,289,500 USD. However, as discussed above, the bids submitted exceed the purchase limit and thus the first bid is reduced to 40,000, and the second bid is rejected.

Table 3 shows the qualified bids after the Auction Administrator has completed the bid evaluation process, with the reduced bid quantities shaded in grey. These are the bids that would be used in calculating the settlement price. Please note that the cumulative allowances and bid costs are also adjusted to reflect reduced bid quantities where applicable.

Table 3: Bids Accepted by Auction Administrator

Entity Name	Bid Price	Submitted Bid Lots	Qualified Bid Allowances	Cumulative Qualified Bid Allowances by Entity	Entity Cumulative Qualified Bid Value
A	\$23.87	40	40,000	40,000	\$954,800
A	\$19.41	55	55,000	95,000	\$1,843,950
A	\$16.23	70	70,000	165,000	\$2,677,950
A	\$13.04	85	85,000	250,000	\$3,260,000
B	\$17.79	80	80,000	80,000	\$1,423,200
B	\$12.75	170	140,000	220,000	\$2,805,000
C	\$45.29	25	25,000	25,000	\$1,132,250
C	\$40.98	100	100,000	125,000	\$5,122,500
C	\$29.83	40	40,000	165,000	\$4,921,950
D	\$22.66	50	50,000	50,000	\$1,133,000
D	\$19.35	120	120,000	170,000	\$3,289,500
E	\$20.75	35	35,000	35,000	\$726,250
E	\$18.46	50	50,000	85,000	\$1,569,100
E	\$16.23	70	70,000	155,000	\$2,515,650
E	\$12.73	110	95,000	250,000	\$3,182,500
F	\$12.73	200	200,000	200,000	\$2,546,000
G	\$20.75	50	40,000	40,000	\$830,000
G	\$19.35	120	0	40,000	\$774,000

V. Settlement Price Determination Procedures

The process to determine the settlement price requires that the Auction Administrator rank qualified bids from all bidders from highest to lowest using the USD value of the bids.⁶ Allowances will be awarded to bidders, beginning with the highest qualified bid price and moving to successively lower qualified bid prices, until the entire supply of allowances is exhausted or all qualified bids have been filled. Each bid will be assessed

⁶ The process for determining the settlement price is the same for the Current and Advance Auctions, although bid guarantee available, purchase limits, and holding limits would likely be different.

against purchase and holding limits and the value of the bid guarantee as described in the previous section. The bid price at which all available allowances are sold or all qualified bids are filled becomes the settlement price; this is the price per allowance that all bidders will be charged for the allowances won in the auction. Bids submitted at prices below the settlement price will not be awarded any allowances.

In determining the settlement price, the Auction Administrator may find that the quantity of allowances bid for at a specific price exceeds the remaining allowances available for sale. When this occurs, a tiebreaker procedure is used to determine the number of allowances awarded to each bidder.

This section provides three examples of the calculation of the settlement price. Example 9 shows the sale of all available allowances with the last winning bid completely exhausting the available allowances. Example 10 shows the settlement price determination when an entity's bid schedule is limited by the entity's submitted bid guarantee. Example 11 illustrates the tiebreaker procedure.

Example 9: Settlement Price When the Last Winning Bid Exhausts the Available Allowances

This example is for bids submitted in the Current Auction. (The process for determining the settlement price is the same for the Current and Advance Auctions.) Qualified bids from Entities A to G in the bid evaluation process provided in Table 3 are used in this settlement price example. For this example, the quantity of allowances available for sale is 1,000,000.

All qualified bids submitted by all bidders are ranked from the highest qualified bid price to the lowest qualified bid price using the USD value of the bid prices. In Table 4, the 5th column (Cumulative Qualified Bid Allowances) shows the cumulative number of allowances for all entities at each declining bid price increment. The 6th column (Allowance Supply Remaining) shows allowances remaining to be sold, which is the difference between the allowance supply of 1,000,000 and the Cumulative Qualified Bid Allowances in the 5th column.

Table 4: Single Round, Sealed Bid Format Example

Entity Name	Bid Price	Submitted Bid Lots	Qualified Bid Allowances	Cumulative Qualified Bid Allowances	Allowance Supply Remaining
C	\$45.29	25	25,000	25,000	975,000
C	\$40.98	100	100,000	125,000	875,000
C	\$29.83	40	40,000	165,000	835,000
A	\$23.87	40	40,000	205,000	795,000
D	\$22.66	50	50,000	255,000	745,000
E	\$20.75	35	35,000	290,000	710,000
G	\$20.75	50	40,000	330,000	670,000
A	\$19.41	55	55,000	385,000	615,000
D	\$19.35	120	120,000	505,000	495,000
G	\$19.35	120	0	505,000	495,000
E	\$18.46	50	50,000	555,000	445,000
B	\$17.79	80	80,000	635,000	365,000
A	\$16.23	70	70,000	705,000	295,000
E	\$16.23	70	70,000	775,000	225,000
A	\$13.04	85	85,000	860,000	140,000
B	\$12.75	170	140,000	1,000,000	0
E	\$12.73	110	95,000	1,095,000	0
F	\$12.73	200	200,000	1,295,000	0

At the highest bid price of \$45.29 USD, only 25,000 allowances have been sold and 975,000 allowances remain to be sold. At the next lower bid price, \$40.98 USD, a total of 125,000 allowances have been sold and 875,000 allowances remain. Continuing down the 6th column, at the bid price of \$12.75 USD, the entire available supply of allowances is sold and qualified bids at prices below \$12.75 USD cannot be filled. Hence, the settlement price is \$12.75 (shaded in grey in Table 4) and 1,000,000 allowances are sold at a total bid cost of \$12,750,000 USD.

Allowances won by each bidder and their respective total bid cost are shown in Table 5 below. Entity A would win 250,000 allowances from its four bids, and its total bid cost is \$3,187,500 USD (250,000 * \$12.75 USD). If Entity A is a QC entity and has submitted a bid guarantee and bids in CAD, the total bid cost of \$3,187,500 USD will be converted to CAD for payment. With an Auction Exchange Rate of 1.1000, this bidder's CAD payment due is \$3,506,250 (250,000 * \$12.75 * 1.1).

Table 5: Winning Bids Example

Bidder Name	Allowances Won	Total Cost (USD)	Total Cost (CAD)
A	250,000	\$3,187,500	\$3,506,250
B	220,000	\$2,805,000	n/a
C	165,000	\$2,103,750	n/a
D	170,000	\$2,167,500	\$2,384,250
E	155,000	\$1,976,250	\$2,173,875
F	0	\$0	n/a
G	40,000	\$510,000	\$561,000
Total	1,000,000	\$12,750,000	n/a

Example 10: Settlement Price Determination When an Entity's Bid Schedule is Limited by the Entity's Submitted Bid Guarantee

This example uses the same bid submissions as the previous example, however the quantity of allowances is increased to 1,060,000. The larger supply of allowances increases entity purchase limits as shown in Table 6 below. Bid guarantees for purposes of this example are also shown in Table 6; note that the bid guarantee for Entity F has been revised.

Table 6: Sample Bid Evaluation Data

Entity Name	Purchase Limit (Number of Allowances)	Holding Limit (Number of Allowances)	Bid Guarantee (USD)
A	265,000	13,014,750	\$3,261,200
B	265,000	13,014,750	\$2,805,100
C	265,000	13,014,750	\$6,407,000
D	265,000	13,014,750	\$3,289,800
E	265,000	13,014,750	\$3,366,400
F	265,000	13,014,750	\$10,000
G	42,400	13,014,750	\$3,289,800

Entity A: Entity A's bids are within the purchase limit and the bid guarantee.

Entity B: Entity B's bids are within the purchase limit. However, Entity B's second bid exceeds the submitted bid guarantee and is limited to 140,000 allowances.

Entity C: Entity C's bids are within the purchase limit and the bid guarantee.

Entity D: Entity D's bids are within the purchase limit and the bid guarantee.

Entity E: Entity E's bids are within the purchase limit. However, Entity E's fourth bid exceeds the submitted bid guarantee and is limited to 109,000 allowances.

Entity F: Entity F's bids are within the purchase limit. However, Entity F's bid exceeds the submitted bid guarantee and is limited to zero allowances.

Entity G: Entity G's first bid exceeds the purchase limit and is limited to 42,000 allowances, while Entity G's second bid is rejected. Entity G's bids are within the bid guarantee.

Table 7 shows the calculation of the settlement price determination with an entity's bids limited by the bid guarantee limitation in an auction with 1,060,000 allowances for sale. In this example, the settlement price is \$12.73 USD.

Table 7: Settlement Price Determination with a Bid Guarantee Limit

Entity Name	Bid Price	Qualified Bid Lots	Qualified Bid Allowances	Auction Cumulative Qualified Bid Allowances	Allowance Supply Remaining
C	\$45.29	25	25,000	25,000	1,035,000
C	\$40.98	100	100,000	125,000	935,000
C	\$29.83	40	40,000	165,000	895,000
A	\$23.87	40	40,000	205,000	855,000
D	\$22.66	50	50,000	255,000	805,000
E	\$20.75	35	35,000	290,000	770,000
G	\$20.75	42	42,000	332,000	728,000
A	\$19.41	55	55,000	387,000	673,000
D	\$19.35	120	120,000	507,000	553,000
G	\$19.35	0	0	507,000	553,000
E	\$18.46	50	50,000	557,000	503,000
B	\$17.79	80	80,000	637,000	423,000
A	\$16.23	70	70,000	707,000	353,000
E	\$16.23	70	70,000	777,000	283,000
A	\$13.04	85	85,000	862,000	198,000
B	\$12.75	140	140,000	1,002,000	58,000
E	\$12.73	109	109,000	1,111,000	0
F	\$12.73	0	0	1,111,000	0

Since there are only 58,000 allowances remaining to be sold after Entity B's last bid was awarded, Entity E's bid at \$12.73 would be awarded a total of 58,000 allowances, the total allowance supply remaining.

The settlement price algorithm is structured to recognize that a bid that is limited by the bid guarantee at a submitted bid price may not be limited as much or limited at all at other potential settlement prices. If a bid quantity is limited by the bid guarantee at the submitted bid price, but could be fulfilled if the settlement price is lower than the submitted bid price, the bidder will be awarded allowances up to the bid quantity and the limits of the bid guarantee. However, the settlement price algorithm will not award the bidder more allowances than they bid for.

For a Current Auction allowance supply of 1,060,000 allowances, the allowances won by each bidder and their respective total bid cost are shown in Table 8.

Table 8: Winning Bids Example

Bidder Name	Allowances Won	Total Cost (USD)	Total Cost (CAD)
A	250,000	\$3,182,500	\$3,500,750
B	220,000	\$2,800,600	n/a
C	165,000	\$2,100,450	n/a
D	170,000	\$2,164,100	\$2,380,510
E	213,000	\$2,711,490	\$2,982,639
F	0	\$0	n/a
G	42,000	\$534,660	\$588,126
Total	1,060,000	\$13,493,800	n/a

Example 11: Tiebreaker Example

Section 95911(e)(5) of the California Regulation and Article 52 of the Québec Regulation specify that the tiebreaker procedure is used when the sum of multiple entities' bid quantities at the settlement price exceeds the remaining allowances available for sale. During the tiebreaker procedure, each entity that has submitted qualified bids at or above the settlement price will be awarded allowances based on its share of qualified bids at the settlement price. An entity with a bid guarantee limited qualified bid will be included in the tiebreaker if it can purchase additional allowances at the settlement price.

Each entity is awarded allowances based on its share of submitted and qualified bids at the settlement price times the number of allowances remaining to be sold, rounded down to the nearest whole allowance. If there are allowances remaining as a result of rounding down, those allowances are awarded to entities by assigning a random number to each entity. The remaining allowances are awarded to entities starting with the lowest assigned random number and proceeding to the next higher random number until all remaining allowances are awarded. Under the tiebreaker procedure, allowances sold to entities in the tiebreaker may not be in lots of 1,000 allowances.

Example 11 includes the same bid submissions as used in Examples 9 and 10. The quantity of allowances available for sale for this example is 850,000. The bid evaluation data for this example including bid guarantee amount, purchase limit, and holding limit for each entity is provided in Table 9; note that the bid guarantee for Entity B has been revised and Entity F's bid guarantee has been returned to its original value.

Table 9: Sample Bid Evaluation Data

Entity Name	Purchase Limit (Number of Allowances)	Holding Limit (Number of Allowances)	Bid Guarantee (USD)
A	212,500	13,014,750	\$3,261,200
B	212,500	13,014,750	\$1,018,500
C	212,500	13,014,750	\$6,407,000
D	212,500	13,014,750	\$3,289,800
E	212,500	13,014,750	\$3,366,400
F	212,500	13,014,750	\$2,577,400
G	34,000	13,014,750	\$3,289,800

Entity A: Entity A's fourth bid exceeds its purchase limit and is limited to 47,000 allowances (47 bid lots). Entity A's bids are within its bid guarantee.

Entity B: Entity B's second bid exceeds the purchase limit and is limited to 132,000 allowances (132 bid lots). However, Entity B's qualified bid(s) is determined by its bid guarantee. Entity B's first bid also exceeds the submitted bid guarantee. Entity B's first bid would be limited to 57,000 allowances (57 bid lots) at the bid price of \$17.79 ($\$1,018,500/17.79 = 57,251$, rounded down to 57,000 allowances). As the settlement price algorithm is structured to recognize that Entity B's bids may not be limited as much at other settlement prices, Entity B's second bid at \$12.75 is evaluated to determine if it can purchase any additional allowances (but no more than 250,000 total), given its bid guarantee. At \$12.75, Entity B's bid guarantee is large enough to purchase 79,000 allowances ($\$1,018,500/\$12.75 = 79,882$). Entity B's qualified second bid is 22,000 allowances ($79,000 - 57,000$), and this is less than the purchase limited qualified bid of 132,000 allowances. As described below, Entity B will be awarded allowances up to the bid quantity and the limits of its bid guarantee at the settlement price.

Entity C: Entity C's bids are within its purchase limit and bid guarantee.

Entity D: Entity D's bids are within its purchase limit and bid guarantee.

Entity E: Entity E's fourth bid exceeds the purchase limit and is limited to 57,000 allowances. However, Entity E's fourth bid also exceeds the submitted bid guarantee and is limited to 109,000 allowances. As Entity E's bids must conform to both the bid guarantee and the purchase limit, Entity E's fourth bid is limited to 57,000 allowances (57 bid lots).

Entity F: Entity F's bids are within the purchase limit and the bid guarantee.

Entity G: Entity G's first bid exceeds the purchase limit and will be limited to 34,000 allowances, and Entity G's second bid is rejected for the same reason. Entity G's bids are within the bid guarantee.

Table 10 shows the determination of the settlement price for the allowance supply of 850,000 allowances. Again, bids from all bidders are ranked from highest bid price to lowest bid price. At \$12.75 USD, there are 35,000 allowances remaining to be sold, but at the next bid price of \$12.73 USD, Entities B, E, and F have qualified bids for 258,000. For this Current Auction, the settlement price is \$12.73 USD where all 850,000 allowances are sold. The Auction Administrator must implement the tiebreaker procedure to determine allowances won by Entities B, E, and F at the settlement price.

Table 10: Settlement Price Determination with a Tiebreaker

Entity Name	Bid Price	Qualified Bid Lots	Qualified Bid Allowances	Cumulative Allowances	Allowance Supply Remaining
C	\$45.29	25	25,000	25,000	825,000
C	\$40.98	100	100,000	125,000	725,000
C	\$29.83	40	40,000	165,000	685,000
A	\$23.87	40	40,000	205,000	645,000
D	\$22.66	50	50,000	255,000	595,000
E	\$20.75	35	35,000	290,000	560,000
G	\$20.75	34	34,000	324,000	526,000
A	\$19.41	55	55,000	379,000	471,000
D	\$19.35	120	120,000	499,000	351,000
G	\$19.35	0	0	499,000	351,000
E	\$18.46	50	50,000	549,000	301,000
B	\$17.79	57	57,000	606,000	244,000
A	\$16.23	70	70,000	676,000	174,000
E	\$16.23	70	70,000	746,000	104,000
A	\$13.04	47	47,000	793,000	57,000
B	\$12.75	22	22,000	815,000	35,000
E	\$12.73	57	57,000	872,000	0
F	\$12.73	200	200,000	1,072,000	0
B	\$12.73	1	1,000	1,073,000	0

Table 10 shows Entity B has a bid for 1 bid lot at \$12.73, shaded in grey. This is not a bid that is in Entity B's bid schedule but represents the additional qualified bid allowances that Entity B can purchase at the settlement price of \$12.73. Entity B's qualified bid of 79,000 allowances at \$12.75 is awarded in the settlement process; however, at the price of \$12.73, Entity B can purchase an additional 1,000 allowances and is part of the tiebreaker with Entity E and Entity F.

Entities B, E, and F have qualified bid allowances totaling 258,000 at the bid price of \$12.73 USD. Entity shares of the 258,000 allowances bid are determined and entities are sold allowances, from the 35,000 remaining, according to their shares, with allowance amounts rounded down. Total allowances sold based on shares may be less than 35,000; the remaining allowances are sold based on random number assignments to entities, lowest random number first.

Entity B's share is 0.003875969 ($1,000 / 258,000 = 0.003875969$).
 Entity E's share is 0.2209302326 ($57,000 / 258,000 = 0.2209302326$).
 Entity F's share is 0.7751937984 ($200,000 / 258,000 = 0.7751937984$).

Entity B would be awarded 135 allowances ($0.003875969 * 35,000$).

Entity E would be awarded 7,732 allowances ($0.2209302326 * 35,000$).

Entity F would be awarded 27,131 allowances ($0.775193798 * 35,000$).

The total number of allowances awarded through this process is 34,998; two allowances remain to be awarded to the entities with the two lowest random numbers. If Entity B is assigned a random number of 5, Entity E is assigned a random number of 200, and Entity F is assigned a random number of 77, one allowance is awarded to Entity B and one allowance is awarded to Entity F.

While Entity B could have purchased up to 80,000 allowances at the settlement price of \$12.73, due to the tiebreaker process Entity B is awarded a total of 79,136 allowances ($57,000 + 22,000 + 135 + 1$).

Allowances won in the tiebreaker are added to allowances won at higher bid prices. For example, Entity E's total allowances are 162,732 ($35,000 + 50,000 + 70,000 + 7,732$).

Allowances won by each bidder and their respective total bid cost are shown in Table 11.

Table 11: Winning Bids Example

Bidder Name	Allowances Won	Total Cost (USD)	Total Cost (CAD)
A	212,000	\$2,698,760	\$2,968,636
B	79,136	\$1,007,401	n/a
C	165,000	\$2,100,450	n/a
D	170,000	\$2,164,100	\$2,380,510
E	162,732	\$2,071,578	\$2,278,736
F	27,132	\$345,390	n/a
G	34,000	\$432,820	\$476,102
Total	850,000	\$10,820,500	n/a

VI. Bid Evaluation in Advance Auction

As previously described, in the bid evaluation examples provided in this document, the assumption is that bids were submitted for a Current Auction. The bid evaluation process for an Advance Auction is the same, although the bid guarantee available, purchase limits, and holding limits would be different.

Bidders submit a single bid guarantee for both the Current Auction and Advance Auction. As shown in Example 3, once the Current Auction settlement price has been determined, the entity's total cost for allowances awarded in the Current Auction (USD settlement price multiplied by number of allowances awarded) will be determined and deducted from the bid guarantee amount, and any bid guarantee amount remaining will be applied to the Advance Auction.